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On The Welfare Benefits of Taxation-                                                     
Charles G St Pierre 
 
A large tax wedge can lead to a dramatic increase in economic efficiency. 
The market share of 'deadweight loss' produced by a tax wedge consists 
of inefficient producers and indifferent consumers.  The high costs in 
resources involved in production of the relatively small quantity of 
'deadweight loss benefits' can be much more efficiently applied elsewhere 
in an economy.  Because of this increase in efficiency, we find a 
substantial government sector and its services may be maintained 
essentially without cost. 
 
We also examine the case of regulation induced wedges and deadweight 
loss, and find comparable results. The case of price floors we find 
equivocal.  Monopoly and comparable economic structures can also result 
in improved economic efficiency. 
 
Because the resultant deterioration of economic performance may be 
dramatic, tax wedges and regulations already in place should be 
examined carefully before their removal. 
 
 
Taxation has historically been considered to be a burden on the productive capacity of an 
economy.  However, it is easy to show that taxation can increase the efficiency of an 
economy by rendering inefficient producers and processes unprofitable, and so 
eliminating them.  What is eliminated from a particular market by proper taxation are the 
most marginal producers, and the least avid consumers.    Under judicious taxation, as a 
result of this increase in efficiency in the use of resources, the services of government can 
largely be provided for for free.  That is, resources which would be applied in some 
inefficient productive process, and so largely wasted, may be applied more efficiently in 
providing economically useful government services. And many of the services provided 
by government, by eliminating many of the costs of transaction and overhead that 
producers would otherwise bear, also act to increase the efficiency of the private 
productive economy.*  Inadequate taxation, and the necessary reduction in economically 
useful services purchased with these taxes, far from increasing the competitiveness of an 
economy, decreases it, and nations with an inadequate public sector are at a competitive 
disadvantage with respect to foreign producers in countries with more robust public 
sectors. Further, even with the light tax burden, the citizens of countries with small public 
sectors are less provided for, and are a greater burden to the industry of that country, than 
countries with a larger government service sector.   
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We show this in Diagram 1.  S’ is the new Supply curve brought about with to the 
increase in costs imposed on producers from taxation.  The marginal benefits (green 
striped triangles) otherwise attained at higher real cost are forgone, the resources which 
would have been spent to obtain those marginal benefits are instead available to be 
expended more efficiently in other sectors of the economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the diagram, the tax wedge is the difference between the price paid by the consumer, 
P’, and the income received by the producer, P*.  The total tax revenue, the pale green 
block in each market defined by: Q’ x (P’ – P*) is the surplus received by government.  
The lower brighter green triangle is the producer surplus; the upper brighter green 
triangle the consumer surplus. In these particular markets, with the application of a tax 
wedge the ratio of social welfare obtained to costs, that is to resources expended, 
increases from about two to one, roughly the ratio of the all the greenish areas to all the 
pinkish areas in each market, to almost four to one, the ratio of the solid green areas to 
the solid pink area. Although we have drawn the diagram for two particular and 
identically composed markets, it is apparent that for a wide variety of supply and demand 
diagrams, and thus for a wide variety of economic sectors, the application of a tax wedge 
will result in a large increase in economic efficiency. By implication, the opportunity 
costs of the small amount of marginal benefits forgone are large. The benefits forgone 
would be obtained by essentially wasting resources in producing them, and are a small 
fraction of the benefits produced by allocating these resources more efficiently.  Indeed, 
we may expect this improvement to be even better than it initially appears, since we 
would expect the most marginal producers to be those most eager to externalize their 
costs in order to remain competitive.  Pressure to externalize costs is thus also reduced on 
the more efficient producers. The economic results from failing to apply a tax wedge in a 
market are, apparently without exception, far inferior 
 
 
P* 
P 
S 
S 
D 
D 
S’ S’ 
P’ 
P’ 
P 
P* 
Quantity 
Quantity 
P
ric
e
 
Q Q Q’ Q’ 
e e 
e’ 
e’ 
e* 
e* 
Market  A 
Market  B 
How  Taxation  can  Increase  Economic  Efficiency   
Reallocation of  Costs     ---- 
Change in Derived Benefits 
The benefits in the green 
striped areas are replaced 
by the benefits in the solid 
green areas.  Lighter green 
accrues to the government Costs   
Forgone 
(Net) Benefits 
Forgone 
Diagram 1 
The Welfare Benefits of Taxation  --           Charles G.  St. Pierre 
 
3 
 
Historically, of course, this relatively small region of forgone welfare has been labeled 
“deadweight loss.,” whose existence has been considered a counter-argument to the 
efficiency and usefulness of taxation. The term dates back at least to Marshall (1), 
although its use in the analysis of tax policy seems to have been established much later by 
Arnold Harberger.  Indeed, the very pejorative “deadweight loss,” has been used by those 
ideologically opposed to government intervention in an economy as a justification for 
their position. However, they, and the economics profession as a whole, have over-looked 
the high opportunity costs involved in the creation of these marginal benefits.  Taking 
these costs into consideration inverts the conclusion:  The gain in freed resources, in 
almost any reasonable scenario, totally outweighs any gain involved in wastefully 
spending these resources for these relatively small benefits.  Indeed, in the scale of 
economic activity, these resources are much more wisely spent elsewhere.  And the tax 
wedge causes this to happen.  Far from being a burden, taxation in a market, and at what 
is traditionally considered a rather high level of taxation, can yield much closer to 
optimal economic results. . 
 
I leave it to the reader to find exceptions to the tax wedge increasing efficiency. I do 
observe that the apparent requirement for monotonicity in the supply and demand curves 
would seem to make finding these exceptions difficult.   
 
One interesting argument, though, which remains, is the argument from liberty.  This 
argument would seem to suggest that the wanton destruction of scarce resources is, 
somehow, ‘liberating.’ For example, this would seem to be the argument against higher 
gasoline taxes in the United States. The case shown here is that a higher gasoline tax, 
even with money spent (more efficiently) on public transit, would free up resources for 
everyone, as the European experience seems to show. 
 
There does remain the issue of determining the balance between efficiency and quantity 
of production in any particular market required for the proper functioning of an economy.  
Considerations of scale indicate that, contrary to what is shown in the diagrams, the first 
unit of anything is seldom the most efficiently produced.  Rather, there is an optimum 
scale of production, that which minimizes the average cost, (This ignores issues of 
demand, and thus actual profit.) and we must consider this to be true for an entire 
economy as well as for a particular production process.  While with this consideration the 
improvement in economic efficiency would not be as great, it must still be expected to be 
impressive. 
 
Further, it should be easier to tax economic wants as opposed to economic needs.  
(Although see problem three, below.) A more efficient economy, however, needs less, 
and so has relatively more resources available for the servicing of wants.   
 
 “Deadweight loss” is also found in other market situations.  It would seem that, at the 
least, these other situations also need to be re-examined.  
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For example, the most marginal producers and the least avid consumers in a particular 
market can also be eliminated when the costs of production are increased by the costs of 
meeting a regulation. These kinds of regulation also can increase economic efficiency.  
Unlike the cost to the producer imposed by a tax, however, the government does not 
directly recover the costs imposed by such regulation. These costs are instead spent 
meeting the requirements of the regulation. In Diagram 2, P* is the price retained by the 
producer, which is the price P’ paid by the consumer, minus the cost to the producer of 
meeting the regulation.   
  
Instead of the tax wedge, we have the revenue in the area Q’ x (P’ – P*), revenue which 
with a tax wedge would be going to the government, going instead to pay for meeting the 
regulation.  The benefits are instead reaped by other sectors of society. A regulation 
against pollution, for instance, benefits the consumers of an otherwise contaminated 
resource.  As such, it essentially represents a rightward shift in the supply curve for this 
other resource.  (Similarly, an increase in pollution of a resource represents a leftward 
shift in the supply curve of that resource.)   This increase in economic efficiency does 
provide compensation to the economy at large for the cost of the regulation.   
 
Further, the purpose of regulation is to attain some benefit for the economy which cannot 
be captured in some unregulated market, and which is presumably greater than the cost of 
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the regulation.  While one might hope, and expect, that the benefit to society of the 
regulation would be at least equal to its cost, it can be seen that, because of the increase in 
economic efficiency, society can gain even when the direct benefits from the regulation 
are substantially lower than its cost to the producer.  (For the same reason, although one 
can hope, and the government should of course try, to make sure that the direct benefits 
to society of its expenditures are equal to the costs, even when the direct benefits of 
government expenditure are below their costs, there can still be a net gain to society, if 
the gain in efficiency is sufficient, and if these resources are not too thoroughly wasted by 
government.)  Certainly, in the provisioning of an economy’s necessities, the inefficient 
application of scarce resources may be necessary. However, even in these situations, 
alternative and more efficient means of supply may be found.    
 
The issue of negative externalities is interesting in itself.  Allowing producers to produce 
a negative externality effectively results in a downward shift in the supply curve: 
Diagram 3.  Here S is the supply curve if the producers must internalize, ie pay, all 
costs.  If they can externalize costs, X (equal to P’ – P*, the price society pays for the 
externality.) they will supply more of what they produce on the lower supply curve S’.  
 
 
Allowing the producers to externalize pollution costs, they produce quantity Q at price P. 
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Examining the striped region, we see that the increase in benefits to consumers, (and 
these are the least avid consumers,) and the benefits to producers (part of their reward for 
polluting,) is essentially balanced out by Pollution’s Costs, (the official ‘Deadweight 
Loss.’)  So what is produced is essentially a wash. That is, for considerable cost in 
resources, that is the Pink striped region, there is essentially no net benefit to society.  So 
we see that, by placing a tax on the producer, equal to the savings the producer would 
gain by externalizing these costs onto society, not only do we get rid of the pollution, but 
we obtain an enormous gain is economic efficiency. In the example of the diagram, 
essentially the same quantity of social welfare is obtained for about half the cost.   
 
We do notice, however, that the industry also gains the lower half of the lighter green 
region of social benefits when it is allowed to pollutes, which benefits are taken from the 
rest of society. In a sense, these benefits are also the polluter’s rewards for its polluting 
behavior. So it is not exactly in the public interest when an industry advocates for its right 
to externalize costs onto society. 
 
In Diagram 4 we examine the effects of a price ceiling on efficiency, and see that, 
initially, at least, the effect on total welfare is similar to a tax wedge.  However, unlike a 
tax wedge, there is no bridge between producer and consumer.  With the price held down 
to the price ceiling P*, the quantity desired Q* is far larger than that quantity Q’ that 
producers are willing to produce at that price.  Under these circumstances, formal costs, 
such as rationing, or informal costs, such as waiting lines, are imposed on consumers, 
which have the practical effect of shifting the Demand curve down to some D’ which 
intersects the Supply curve at the same point as the price ceiling P*, and the produced 
quantity Q’. This is necessarily so since, (legally) this is the quantity and price that will 
be produced, and nothing more is available to be consumed.  Here the eventuality of any 
increase in economic efficiency would seem to be problematic.  Costs to consumers 
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which with a tax wedge might be harvested by government are instead merely dissipated.  
 
 
 
 
 
Interestingly, however, applying a tax wedge, or imposing regulation are not the only 
ways to increase economic efficiency.  Monopolies also eliminate much inefficient 
production of goods and services, as shown. 
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Monopolies produce the quantity at QM, (Diagram 5) the quantity where the increase in 
cost for producing another unit equals the increase in revenue for selling another unit.  
This quantity maximizes their profit.  (This is different from a competitive market, where 
the sum of production of all firms would be where the Marginal Cost  MC, or the Supply 
curve, intersects the Demand curve D at eC.) With monopoly, the striped areas are the 
costs (Red striped) and benefits (Green striped) forgone by society. These resources 
which would otherwise be consumed, these costs, may be more efficiently applied to 
other sectors of the economy. The solid areas are costs borne (Red) and benefits provided 
(the Greens) under monopoly.  The light green regions are monopoly profits which, since 
a monopoly is a part of society, does count as an increase in social welfare. We may 
expect something similar with monopsonies, and to a somewhat lesser extent, with 
oligopolies, and oligopsonies. With oligopolies and oligopsonies, we would expect a 
greater elimination of inefficient production when they are collusive, and a less but a still 
significant degree of elimination when they are competitive. With oligopolies, although 
some inefficient producers may be protected because of the higher prices resulting from 
the reduced quantity produced,  a reduced quantity is produced, and those firms which 
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remain in production would tend to limit their production to their most efficient 
processes.  The inefficient production forgone, what would have been produced, and 
consumed, in a competitive market, constitutes the deadweight loss.   The less efficient 
processes forgone constitute the ‘deadweight cost.’ 
  
To return to monopolies, the great majority of benefits accrue to the owners of the 
monopoly, typically a small minority of the members of society.  The consumer benefits, 
on the other hand, are much less, and much reduced from the competitive case. Indeed, 
by comparing the tax wedge in a competitive market with the monopoly case, we find the 
social welfare under monopolies is exactly the same as social welfare under a 
government tax wedge, where the wedge is such that the marginal cost to producers 
equals their marginal revenue.  The competitive case results in a more equitable 
distribution of benefits between consumers and producers. Of course, consumer benefits 
per se are also much less under taxation, the same as under monopoly, and the producer 
surplus much less. However, the government spreads much of its income widely. It is, in 
its way, both a consumer and a producer. It re-distributes consumption, and capitalizes 
production, both directly, through capital investments, and indirectly, through subsidy of 
production, and creation and maintenance of infrastructure. And all of its expenditure, 
purported to be for the public benefit, does, one way or another, enrich various sectors of 
the economy. 
 
One problem with the tax wedge, however, because it favors the more efficient 
producers, it also favors the economic drift toward concentration of ownership, and the 
creation of oligopolies and eventually monopolies. Narrowly held monopolies cannot be 
expected to spread their profits.  Neither can monopolists be expected to spend their 
profits to provide services which increase the efficiency of the larger economy.   
Monopolies once formed, and where not widely owned, further to aggravate the natural 
tendency of economies to concentrate wealth and power, a concentration which leads to 
economic instability and collapse. This is especially so because the power concentrated in 
monopolies tends to translate into political power.  And the monopolist must be expected 
to use this power to further his power, mitigating the impact of the tax wedge on his 
revenue.   
 
A second problem is that producers which escape taxation will eventually displace those 
producers which are subject to taxation. The result will be a reduction in both taxes 
collected and in economic efficiency.  This problem must be considered especially acute 
in open economies, where tax paying domestic producers can be expected to be displaced 
by non-taxpaying (and hence often less efficient) foreign producers.  The interesting 
implication here is that, while a nation’s economy may be producing less and consuming 
more, as an increased share of what is consumed is imported, (much of what is 
considered production actually either enables consumption, or is a form of consumption,) 
that economy need not be any better off for this increase in consumption.  Because of the 
decrease in economic efficiency, fewer consumables will be efficiently used, and more of 
this consumption will be squandered.  
 
A third problem is, of course, the politics of taxation.  Nobody likes to be taxed, and the 
powerful, more than others, are capable of avoiding it. (This also bears on the second 
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problem.) This first suggests that the markets which serve the wealthy will be the least 
efficient, even though these are the markets where an economy can most easily bear the 
loss of marginal producers.  (Marginal producers may be needed in the production of an 
economy’s necessities.)  And this further suggests that a disproportionate share of an 
economy will be dedicated to servicing the wealthy, even at the expenses of the 
necessities of that economy, such as maintenance of infrastructure.  For instance, a recent 
study has shown that in the United States today, a very few policies are enacted by the 
government which are not also approved by the wealthy elite. (2) An implication of this 
is that the tax burden upon this elite can only be expected to diminish, and thus that the 
burden of taxation on the rest of economy and the population can only increase.  
 
One final consideration.  As an economy increases in efficiency, it inherently becomes 
less stable, and more vulnerable to collapse. An efficient economy becomes dependent on 
its efficiency in order to be productive enough to sustain itself.  The greater the 
efficiency, the greater its dependence.  A reduction in efficiency will result in a reduction 
of production, perhaps sufficient enough that that economy can no longer sustain itself.   
 
A particular consideration regarding improvements in efficiency brought about by 
regulation and the tax wedge, where these increases in efficiency are already established, 
is that removing or even merely reducing these factors will result in a reduction of that 
efficiency, and a resulting reduction in the productive capacity of that economy.  That 
economy may no longer be able to sustain itself. With a critical reduction in production, 
cascades may result, and the possibility of sectoral and even general collapse.  Great care, 
therefore, should be exercised in the reduction of the size of tax wedges, or the 
elimination or alteration of any significant regulation.   
 
________________________________________ 
 
*Efficiency is a multiplicative factor in production, not an additive one. Although unlike 
thermodynamic efficiency, economic efficiency may be greater than 1, it is also subject 
to diminishing returns, at least where matters of the production of real goods and services 
are concerned. 
______________________________________ 
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